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Workers' Rights Provisions in Fast Track Authority,
1974-2007: An Historical Perspective and
Current Analysis
CAROL PIER*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the trajectory of workers' rights provisions in 'fast track"
authority legislation allowing the U.S. president to negotiate free trade agreements
that Congress can only approve or reject, not amend. I begin my analysis with the
Trade Act of1974 and continue through the expiration offast track authority in 1994.
Against this backdrop, I critique the workers' rights negotiating objectives and priori-
ties in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA). Relying on
TPA's confused legislative history and basic rules of statutory inteipretation, the article
seeks to interpret TPA's workers' rights provisions. It concludes by examining the prac-
tical implications of TPA's workers' rights negotiating objectives and priorities, as
currently applied, by assessing the workers' rights provisions in the trade accords con-
cluded under TPA. Ultimately, I find that, despite pronouncements to the contrary,
TPA is a step backward fiom the Trade Act of 1974, which instructed U.S. trade ne-
gotiators to ensure that "the global trading system, as governed by GATT included an
enforceable requirement that countries adhere to internationalfair labor standards."
INTRODUCTION
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA), included in
the Trade Act of 2002, is the latest incarnation of "fast track" authority, first
given to the U.S. president by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974. The primary
purpose of fast track authority is to allow the president to negotiate free trade
agreements that Congress can only approve or reject, not amend. Like its prede-
cessors, however, TPA also establishes a substantive and procedural framework
for the negotiation and subsequent congressional consideration of free trade ac-
cords. Its negotiating objectives and priorities address myriad trade-related is-
*The author is the labor rights and trade researcher for Human Rights Watch. The views
expressed herein, however, are entirely her own.
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sues, including workers' rights, and directly impact trade agreement terms by
guiding U.S. trade negotiators' treatment of these issues.
This article will examine the history of workers' rights provisions in fast track
authority, beginning with the Trade Act of 1974 and continuing through the ex-
piration of fast track authority on April 15, 1994. Against this historical backdrop,
the article will analyze the workers' rights negotiating objectives and priorities in
TPA. It will review the contentious congressional debate that surrounded TPA's
labor rights provisions, identifying the key points of contention and discussing the
disparate and often contradictory rhetoric used to characterize the workers' rights
language. Relying on this confused legislative history, as well as the basic rules of
statutory interpretation, the article will seek to interpret TPA's workers' rights
provisions. It will conclude by examining the practical implication of TPA's labor
rights objectives and priorities, as currently applied, by assessing the workers'
rights provisions in the trade accords concluded under TPA.'
I. HISTORY OF FAST TRACK WORKERS' RIGHTS PROVISIONS
From 1974 until its lapse in 1994, fast track was renewed roughly every four
to five years: in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979; the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984; and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Trade Act of
1988). After being extended by approximately one year in 1993, however, fast
track expired,2 not to be renewed again until the Trade Act of 2002 created TPA,
which has been extended through June 30, 2007. Although changes were made
as each fast track authority was renewed, key changes to workers' rights provi-
sions only occurred twice after the initial authorization of 1974-in the Trade
Act of 1988 and in the Trade Act of 2002.
A. Trade Act of 1974
The overall and principal trade negotiating objectives set out in sections 104
through 107 of the 1974 fast track authority do not include guidance on linking
workers' rights and trade. Instead, the Trade Act of 1974 addresses the labor-
1. The debate over linking workers' rights and trade, as well as the appropriate means for
achieving such linkage in trade accords, are beyond the scope of this article.
2. The 1988 fast track applied to all qualifying agreements entered into before June 1, 1993.
That date was extended through April 15, 1994, only with respect to the Uruguay Round trade
agreements, discussed below. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(a)(1)(A), (e)(l) (2000).
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trade linkage in its section titled, "Steps to be Taken Toward GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Revision: Authorization of Appropriations
for GATT." In that section, the Trade Act of 1974 orders that the president, "as
soon as practicable .... take such action as may be necessary to bring trade agree-
ments heretofore entered into, and the application thereof, into conformity with
principles promoting the development of an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair
world economic system," including through "the adoption of international fair
labor standards and of public petition and confrontation procedures in the
GATT.' 3
During the period that the Trade Act of 1974's workers' rights terms were in
effect, from January 1975 until August 1988, the GATT was the only multi-
lateral instrument governing international trade.4 Thus, revision of the GATT
to fulfill the terms' objectives would have significantly impacted the global trad-
ing order, introducing enforceable workers' rights standards into all trading re-
lationships among the GATT parties, numbering roughly eighty-two in
January 1975 and nearly ninety-five by August 1988.'
The Senate Finance Committee Report of November 26, 1974, explains the
rationale behind the Trade Act of 1974's workers' rights directive:
The Committee believes that international fair labor standards and
procedures to enforce them should be established.... It
believes.., that additional steps are needed which would lead to
the elimination of unfair labor conditions which substantially dis-
rupt or distort international trade. The international trading com-
munity should seek to develop principles with respect to earnings,
hours and conditions of employment of workers, and to adopt pub-
lic petition and bargaining procedures. Efforts should be made to
provide private persons the opportunity to appear before interna-
tional economic organizations to present grievances. At the very
3. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121, 88 Stat. 1978, 1986 (1975).
4. The GATT entered into force in January 1948 and is the predecessor of the World Trade
Organization, created in January 1995. Although the GATT's tariff concessions and trade rules
have been revised through numerous negotiating rounds since 1948, the GATT, as revised, is still
in effect today as one of the many trade instruments composing the legal framework of the World
Trade Organization. See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 15-17 (3d ed. 2003).
5. See World Trade Org., The 128 Countries that had Signed GATT by 1994, http://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/gattmeme.htm.
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least, it would be appropriate to allow governments acting in their
behalf to make representations concerning labor conditions.6
When read in light of its relevant legislative history, this directive not only
affirms the linkage between workers' rights and global trade but suggests a
rough structure for its practical implementation within the GATT-through a
petition process, available at least to states if not also to private parties. By calling
for enforceable universal labor standards within the GATT, the Trade Act of
1974 addresses one of the key issues characterizing the debate over the workers'
rights and trade linkage: should countries be required to abide by internation-
ally recognized workers' rights, or should they be required only to enforce their
existing labor laws, leaving standard-setting to their discretion?
At the GATT's Tokyo Round-the seventh round of negotiations, which
lasted from 1973 through 1979 7 -the United States arguably took a first step to-
ward fulfilling the Trade Act of 197 4's workers' rights directive when it pro-
posed discussion of four "minimum international labor standards" regarding
slave or forced labor, child labor, workplace health and safety, and discrimina-
tory practices applied to exports! However, the U.S. proposal was ultimately re-
jected by other countries. As a result, the United States chose not to present a
formal proposal on workers' rights, reportedly fearing negative repercussions
for its other trade negotiating priorities.9 Nonetheless, in 1978, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative created an interagency group to look further into the
issue of addressing workers' rights during the Tokyo Round. ° Almost one year
later, the United States presented to the GATT Consultative Group of 18 (CG-
18) a proposal calling for minimum labor standards at least to be considered as
part of the post-Tokyo Round work program." The CG-18 also failed to sup-
port this proposal, however, and it went no further. 2
6. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 7233-34 (1974).
7. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 4, at 16.
8. Peter S. Watson, The FrameworkJfor the New Trade Agenda, 25 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1237,
1253 (1994).
9. Id. See also Elisabeth Cappuyns, Linking Labor Standards and Trade Sanctions: An Analysis of
Their Current Relationship, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 659,665-66 (1998).
10. 140 CONG. REc. E759 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brown).
11. The CG-18 was an informal, high-level group of countries, generally chosen at the annual
meeting of GATT parties, that discussed broad trade issues but possessed virtually no decision-
making power.
12. Watson,supra note 8, at 1253.
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Approximately seven years later, in the fall of 1986, during the preparatory
phase for the Uruguay Round-the eighth and final round of GATT negotia-
tions-the United States once again pushed for the inclusion of workers' rights
in the GATT negotiating agenda.' Other countries again failed to support the
proposal, however, and the issue was left off the September 1986 Punta del Este
declaration officially launching the Uruguay Round. 4 In July 1987, the United
States tried once more, adopting an alternative approach by formally requesting
a working party on the linkage between workers' rights and trade that was sep-
arate from the negotiating round. The United States proposed to address five
basic international labor standards in the working party: freedom of association;
freedom to organize and bargain collectively; freedom from forced or compul-
sory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children; and measures set-
ting minimum standards in respect to conditions of work. 5 The U.S. proposal
was again rebuffed, however, and no working group was established. 6
As a result, although U.S. trade negotiators took steps toward fulfilling the
directive to "take such action as may be necessary" to secure the "adoption of
international fair labor standards and of public petition and confrontation pro-
cedures in the GATT," the ultimate goal was never achieved.
Subsequent U.S. trade acts and fast track authorities have not called for the
adoption of enforceable international workers' rights standards either in the
GATT or in other free trade agreements. Although fast track legislation since
1974 has increasingly included more labor rights negotiating objectives and pri-
orities, this greater quantity of provisions has been characterized by weaker and
more ambiguous language. The simple and clear wording of the Trade Act of
1974's directive on workers' rights can thus be seen as the high-water mark in
U.S. fast track legislation's treatment of the workers' rights and trade linkage.
B. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
After over thirteen years in force, the labor rights provisions in the Trade
Act of 1974 were amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
13. R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enterprises and International Labor
Standards: Which Way for Development and Jobs?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE 141, 161 n.63 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Watson, supra
note 8, at 1254.
14. Watson,supra note 8, at 1254.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Cappuyns, supra note 9, at 666; Gadbaw & Medwig,supra note 13, at 152.
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1988. The 1988 legislation shifts treatment of workers' rights from the GATT
appropriations section, where the Trade Act of 1974 includes its specific direc-
tive on the issue, to the principal trade negotiating objectives section. The Trade
Act of 1988 includes among its principal negotiating objectives:
(A) to promote respect for worker rights;
(B) to secure a review of the relationship of worker rights to
GATT articles, objectives, and related instruments with a view to
ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are available to all
workers; and
(C) to adopt, as a principle of the GATT, that the denial of worker
rights should not be a means for a country or its industries to gain
competitive advantage in international trade.
7
The Act provides that trade agreements entered into under the Act must
"make[] progress in meeting" the enumerated negotiating objectives. 8
The Trade Act of 1988 does not further explain the objective to "promote
respect for worker rights," leaving the definition of "promote" to the discretion
of the U.S. president. Instead, as in the Trade Act of 1974, the workers' rights
and trade linkage is largely addressed with reference to the GATT. The 1988 ne-
gotiating objectives, however, are weaker than the 1974 directive in several key
aspects.
The 1988 legislation, for example, provides no guidance on how its workers'
rights objectives should be fulfilled. It fails to elaborate on how to ensure "that
the benefits of the trading system are available to all workers" or that the viola-
tion of workers' rights is not utilized to attract trade. In contrast, these principles
underlie the workers' rights directive of the Trade Act of 1974, which explicitly
dictates how they should be carried out: through the adoption of enforceable
workers' rights provisions in the GATT. Similarly, the Trade Act of 1988 pro-
vides no reference point for understanding "worker rights," failing to identify
whether "worker rights" should be defined by internationally recognized stan-
dards or countries' domestic laws. The Trade Act of 1974, however, explicitly
called for the adoption of universally recognized standards.
17. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(14) (2000).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c)(3)(A) (2000).
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Nonetheless, guided by the Trade Act of 1988's negotiating objectives, U.S.
trade negotiators again pushed to include workers' rights in the GATT's Uruguay
Round, proposing in early 1994 that the following language be included in the
political declaration of Marrakesh, where the final Uruguay Round Agreements
creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) were signed:19
The Ministers recognize that the more open multilateral trading
system resulting from the Uruguay Round should benefit work-
ers around the world through the impact of increased trade on
employment and income. They also expressed the view that trade
gains should not come from the relaxation of social objectives and,
in this connection, have agreed to undertake early consideration
of the relationship between the trading system and internationally
recognized labor standards. 20
Like its predecessors, this proposal met significant opposition. Although the
United States threatened to withhold its signature from the Uruguay Round
Agreements unless they included an explicit commitment to address workers'
rights in the WTO's future agenda, the United States did not follow through on
this threat. 21 Instead, the United States signed the accords, which contained no
such commitment. As a result, as during the Tokyo Round, U.S. trade negotia-
tors once again failed to fulfill the end goals articulated in the domestic legisla-
tion governing their international trade negotiations.
II. TRADE ACT OF 2002
The principal negotiating objectives on workers' rights established in the
Trade Act of 1988 remained in effect until fast track authority expired in 1994.
The U.S. president did not enjoy fast track authority again until TPA was ap-
proved as part of the Trade Act of 2002.
TPA shifts the focus of fast track's workers' rights provisions from making
changes at the WTO level to the more general principle, included as a principal
19. Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note 13, at 161 n.63.
20. Labor Standards Jeopardize Final Deal, TRADE WK. REV. & RECENT PUBLICATIONS, Apr. 1,
1994, http://www.etext.org/Politics/Trade.News/Volume.3/tnb-03.013.
21. See id.
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negotiating objective in the Trade Act of 1988, of "promoting respect for work-
ers' rights" through trade. TPA elaborates on this principle, setting out new and
far more extensive workers' rights provisions than its predecessors. TPA in-
cludes workers' rights provisions in all three of its sections providing substantive
guidance to U.S. trade negotiators: "Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives";
"Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives"; and "Promotion of Certain Priori-
ties." 22 Yet, as discussed below, TPA nonetheless falls short of the workers' rights
standard established in the Trade Act of 1974.
A. TPA on Workers' Rights in the WTO
In contrast to its two main predecessors, the Trade Act of 2002 addresses the
linkage between workers' rights and the WTO only in its section on Promotion
of Certain Priorities. TPA establishes as a priority to "seek greater cooperation
between the WTO and the ILO [International Labour Organization]. 23
TPA's priorities, however, are understood to enjoy second-class status
among those TPA provisions providing substantive guidance to trade negotia-
tors. For example, TPA establishes that an agreement "regarding tariff and non-
tariff barriers" may be entered into "only if such agreement makes progress in
meeting" the Act's principal and overall negotiating objectives, failing to require
any progress toward fulfilling TPA's articulated certain priorities. 24 As Senator
Phil Gramm (R-TX) noted, these priorities "do not carry the same weight as
[TPA's overall and principal negotiating objectives]," discussed below, "[r]ather,
22. The international workers' rights priorities include: "seek greater cooperation between the
WTO and the ILO"; "seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agree-
ments.., to promote respect for core labor standards.., and report to the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on the
content and operation of such mechanisms"; "direct the Secretary of Labor to consult with any
country seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that country's labor laws
and provide technical assistance to that country if needed"; "in connection with any trade negoti-
ations entered into under this Act, submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a meaningful labor rights report of
the country, or countries, with respect to which the President is negotiating"; and "with respect to
any trade agreement which the President seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures,
submit to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the country or countries that are
parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor." 19 U.S.C. §
3802(c)(l)-(2), (7)-(9) (Supp. 112002).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c)(1).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 3803(b)(2) (Supp. 112002).
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they are overall priorities that should be considered in general but by no means
are items that should be the focus of a trade agreement.
25
Furthermore, TPA's priority addressing the trade and labor linkage in the
WTO context is a significant step backwards from preceding fast track author-
ities' treatment of the issue. Rather than seeking to address workers' rights
within the WTO institutional framework as the Trade Acts of 1974 and 1988
had done, TPA implicitly accepts WTO members' declaration at the 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference that the ILO, rather than the WTO, "is the
competent body to set and deal with these Ilinternationally recognized labor]
standards. '26 Departing from the Trade Act of 1988, TPA does not call for a re-
view of the relationship between labor rights and the WTO nor seek WTO
adoption of the principle that denial of workers' rights is an illegitimate means
for attracting trade. Similarly, unlike the Trade Act of 1974, TPA does not seek
enforceable universal labor standards in the WTO. To the contrary, as discussed
below, there is significant debate over whether TPA would even permit U.S.
trade negotiators to pursue that 1974 goal either in the WTO or in other bi-
lateral, multilateral, or regional trade accords.
TPA's sole priority addressing workers' rights in the WTO is nonetheless
reminiscent of a similar provision found in the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, enacted in December 1994 to implement the agreements creating the
WTO. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act directs the president to "seek the
establishment ... in the WTO, of a working party to examine the relationship
of internationally recognized worker rights.., to the articles, objectives, and re-
lated instruments of the... WTO'' 27 and sets forth four objectives for the work-
ing party:
(1) explore the linkage between international trade and inter-
nationally recognized worker rights ... taking into account dif-
ferences in the level of development among countries; (2) examine
the effects on international trade of the systematic denial of such
rights; (3) consider ways to address such effects; and (4) develop
25. S. REP. No. 107-139, at 41-42 (2002).
26. World Trade Org., Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/
DEC/W, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997), available at http'//www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/
min96_e/wtodec e.htm.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 355 1(a) (2000).
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methods to coordinate the work program of the working party
with the International Labor Organization.
28
TPA, however, only includes the last of these four objectives as a negotiating
priority.
Thus, TPA not only falls short of the standard set by the Trade Acts of 1974
and 1988 for addressing the workers' rights and trade linkage in the WTO con-
text but also that of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994. Instead, TPA
follows the approach, adopted by the WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference,
of relegating workers' rights to the exclusive jurisdiction of the ILO.
Nonetheless, the debate over the practical implications of TPA's workers'
rights provisions has not primarily focused on the treatment of workers' rights
in the WTO. No subsequent WTO ministerial conferences have made any
meaningful progress toward altering the position adopted on workers' rights at
the 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference, and the issue has largely been
sidelined by members struggling to reach consensus on other trade-related is-
sues. With workers' rights to a great extent marginalized at the WTO, disagree-
ment over TPA's workers' rights provisions has, instead, focused primarily on
whether U.S. negotiators of other multilateral, regional, or bilateral free trade
agreements can, as the Trade Act of 1974 directed over twenty years ago, seek
the adoption of enforceable universal labor standards. This highly contentious
debate revolves around the interpretation and application of TPA's overall and
principal negotiating objectives.
B. TPA's Overall and Principal Negotiating Objectives
TPA establishes a number of overall and principal negotiating objectives on
workers' rights that U.S. negotiators are directed to pursue in free trade negoti-
ations.
TPA includes among its overall negotiating objectives: "to promote respect
for worker rights ... and an understanding of the relationship between trade
and worker rights";29 "to seek provisions in trade agreements under which par-
ties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the
protections afforded in domestic.., labor laws as an encouragement for
28. 19 U.S.C. § 3551(a)-(b) (2000).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(6) (Supp. II 2002).
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trade";3" and "to promote universal ratification and full compliance with ILO
convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor."'"
TPA's key principal negotiating objectives on labor include: "to ensure that
a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively en-
force its ... labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or in-
action, in a manner affecting trade between the United States and that party";
32
to "strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect
for core labor standards";33 and "to seek commitments by parties to trade agree-
ments to vigorously enforce their own laws prohibiting the worst forms of child
labor."3
4
TPA's principal negotiating objectives on workers' rights, however, also
contain important qualifying language, set forth as principal negotiating objec-
tive (I 1)(B):
[T]o recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the right to
exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regard-
ing the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to
other labor ... matters determined to have higher priorities, and
to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its laws if a
course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such
discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allo-
cation of resources, and no retaliation may be authorized based on
30. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(7).
31.19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(9).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(l 1)(A)
33. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11)(C). TPA defines "core labor standards" as: "the right of association";
"the right to organize and bargain collectively"; "a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor"; "a minimum age for the employment of children"; and "acceptable conditions
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health." 19
U.S.C. § 3813(6) (Supp. II 2002). This definition, however, excludes "the elimination of discrimi-
nation in respect of employment and occupation," which the ILO has identified as one of the four
fundamental workers' rights, which also include: "freedom of association and the effective recog-
nition of the right to collective bargaining"; "the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labour"; and "the effective abolition of child labour." See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work, art. 2, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1988).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(17).
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the exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor
standards .. .
The important and fundamental distinction between these overall and prin-
cipal negotiating objectives is established in principal negotiating objective
(12)(G) on dispute settlement and enforcement, which sets out as an objective:
"to seek provisions that treat United States principal negotiating objectives
equally with respect to" access to dispute settlement mechanisms and the proce-
dures and remedies offered by those mechanisms.36 As a result, under TPA, only
those trade agreement provisions that fulfill the principal negotiating objectives
must be enforceable, giving rise to dispute settlement proceedings and possible
fines or sanctions if violated.37 Those trade agreement provisions that, to the con-
trary, fulfill either the overall negotiating objectives or certain articulated prior-
ities need not be enforceable through dispute settlement procedures and
remedies equal to other accord provisions and, instead, may be merely hortatory
and aspirational.
The qualifying language of principal negotiating objective (I1)(B) and the
distinction between overall and principal negotiating objectives clarified in
principal negotiating objective (12)(G) are at the center of the debate over TPA's
workers' rights provisions: can TPA's overall negotiating objectives give rise to
enforceable workers' rights protections in free trade accords or, to the contrary,
does TPA preclude this possibility?
C. TPA and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
1. The Jordan Standard on Workers' Rights
The debate over the interpretation and application of TPA's workers' rights
provisions has largely unfolded against the backdrop of the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement (U.S.-Jordan FTA), signed by the U.S. president in October
2000 and entered into force in December 2001. The U.S.-Jordan FTA is seen by
many as the high-water mark for the inclusion of strong workers' rights provi-
sions in free trade agreements. The question at the heart of the debate can be re-
framed with reference to the U.S.-Jordan FTA: does TPA permit U.S.
35. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(1 1)(B).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(12)(G) (emphasis added).
37. See id.
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negotiators to negotiate free trade agreements that meet the workers' rights
standard of the U.S.-Jordan FTA (Jordan standard)?
To answer this fundamental question, it is imperative to understand not
only the legal text of the U.S.-Jordan FTA workers' rights provisions, but also
the disagreement regarding that accord's interpretation.
The U.S.-Jordan FTA contains four key workers' rights provisions, as well as a
fifth that acknowledges that "cooperation between [the parties] provides enhanced
opportunities to improve labor standards."38 The four key provisions require parties
to: "strive to ensure" that the labor principles of the ILO Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work and the internationally recognized labor rights set
forth in the accord are recognized and protected by national law; "strive to ensure"
that they do not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise der-
ogate from, national labor laws as an encouragement for trade; "strive to ensure" that
their laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internationally recognized
labor rights set forth in the accord and "strive to" improve those standards in that
light; and not fail to effectively enforce their labor laws through a sustained or recur-
ring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade between the parties.
39
These requirements, however, also have caveats. The requirement that par-
ties strive to ensure that their laws meet international standards and to improve
those laws is qualified by the explicit recognition of each party's parallel right "to
establish its own domestic labor standards."4 Similarly, the requirement that par-
ties effectively enforce their labor laws is qualified by the clarification that each
party also "retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory,
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regard-
ing the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters
determined to have higher priorities." Accordingly, "the Parties understand that
a Party is in compliance with [the agreement] where a course of action or inaction
reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide deci-
sion regarding the allocation of resources."4i
38. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, art. 6(5), Oct. 24, 2000,
41 I.L.M. 63, 70 (entered into force Dec. 17,2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
39. Id. art. 6(1)-(4), 41 I.L.M. at 70. The workers' rights identified by the U.S.-Jordan FTA as
"internationally recognized labor rights" are the same rights that TPA lists as "core labor stan-
dards." The U.S.-Jordan FTA also defines "labor laws" for the purposes of the accord as those statutes
and regulations directly related to those rights. Id. art. 6(6), 41 I.L.M. at 71. See supra note 34.
40. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 38, art. 6(3), 41 I.L.M. at 70.
41. Id. art. 6(4)(b), 41 I.L.M. at 70.
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These caveats, combined with the "strive to" qualifier preceding three of the
four key workers' rights provisions, have complicated efforts to arrive upon one
accepted interpretation of the Jordan standard on workers' rights. For example,
during the congressional debate over TPA, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA),
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, commented:
[N]o one really knows what the "Jordan Standard" is. In fact,
when we held a hearing on the Jordan Free Trade Agreement on
March 20, 2001 in the Senate Finance Committee, one of the most
controversial issues raised was what the labor.., provisions of the
Jordan Free Trade Agreement actually mean.... Ambassador
Michael Smith, former Deputy United States Trade Representa-
tive and the first American Ambassador to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, testified that "Articles 5 and 6 [of the
Jordan FTA] as written are largely fluff, open to widely differing,
even if plausible, interpretations and, as such, causes for possible
unfortunate differences between Jordan and the United States in
the years ahead as the agreement is implemented."42
Despite the confusion and discord, the U.S.-Jordan FTA workers' rights
provisions do, in fact, provide a clear standard on workers' rights, characterized
by three key components. The first component sets the U.S.-Jordan FTA apart
from all other free trade accords: all provisions of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, be they
labor, environmental, or commercial, if violated, are subject to the same dispute
settlement mechanism and remedies.4" As noted in the legislative history of the
42. 148 CONG. REc. S9107, S9107-08 (daily ed. Sept. 24,2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
43. In July 2001, the United States and Jordan signed side letters on labor and environment in
which they stated that they "would not expect or intend to apply the Agreement's dispute settlement
procedures to secure its rights under the Agreement in a manner that results in blocking trade."
They further added that they consider "that appropriate measures for resolving any differences that
may arise regarding the Agreement would be bilateral consultations and other procedures, particu-
larly alternative mechanisms, that will help to secure compliance without recourse to traditional
trade sanctions." Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, to Marwan
Muasher, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of America (July
23, 2001), available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi ?204:67:298771046:313; Letter
from Marwan Muasher, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of
America, to Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative (July 23, 2001), available at
http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?204:67:298771046:312. These letters, however, are an
expression of executive will and cannot override the legal text of the ratified accord.
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U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act, which gives effect to the
U.S.-Jordan FTA in the United States, "the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement
accords the labor and environmental provisions equal status to all other provi-
sions in the agreement, including with regard to dispute settlement and enforce-
ment."44 The second component is also relatively straightforward: with the
caveat that parties retain discretion over enforcement and resource allocation
decisions, the U.S.-Jordan FTA requires parties to effectively enforce their labor
laws in those areas affecting trade between them. It is the third component,
however, that lies at the heart of the controversy over the Jordan standard, estab-
lishing that while parties retain the right to set their own domestic labor stan-
dards, they must strive to ensure that their labor laws meet and protect
international standards, strive to improve those laws in that light, and strive to
ensure that they do not weaken or offer to weaken those laws to attract trade.
The "strive to" language is the primary source of confusion over the Jordan
standard's third component. Some argue that requiring a country to strive to ful-
fill an obligation is such a soft directive that, at the end of the day, it is unenforce-
able. For example, in March 2004, the editorial page of the Washington Post
observed, "Jordan merely promises to 'strive to ensure' compliance, a term too
vague to provide for a strong right of action."45 Similarly, in the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Ways and Means Report on the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Area Implementation Act, five representatives wrote, "Much of the...
labor language does not establish binding obligations. The parties are, for ex-
ample, committed only to 'strive to ensure' that their domestic ... labor laws
will not be relaxed."46
"Strive to" qualifying language, however, does not render the directives fol-
lowing it unenforceable. Though it weakens those requirements, they nonetheless
contain binding terms. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights' (CESCR) comments on similar language contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are in-
structive. The ICESCR requires each state party "to take steps .... to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
44. H.R. REP. No. 107-176, pt. 1, at 18 (2001).
45. Editorial, Trade and the Campaign, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2004, at A24.
46. H.R. REP. No. 107-176, pt. 1, at 22 (2001) ("Additional Views" of Reps. Doggett, Matsui,
McDermott, Lewis, and Thurman).
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means."4 7 Although the qualifying language of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the
ICESCR differs slightly, the implications are similar, as reflected in the CESCR
comment that "even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate,
the obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the widest possible en-
joyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances."48
Explaining the significance of requiring states parties to take steps or strive
toward an ultimate goal, the CESCR explains that:
[W]hile the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved
progressively, steps toward that goal must be taken within a rea-
sonably short time after the Covenant's entry into force for the
States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and
targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations rec-
ognized in the Covenant.
49
The CESCR further notes:
[T]he fact that realization over time, or in other words progres-
sively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinter-
preted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content ....
[Tihe phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective...
of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States
parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question.
It ... imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effec-
tively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately
retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most
careful consideration and would need to be fully justified.5"
If a similar analysis is applied to the third component of the Jordan stan-
dard, three key elements of that component emerge. First, the parties must take
47. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
48. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3:
The Nature of States Parties Obligations It, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) (emphasis
added).
49. Id. 2.
50. Id. 9.
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"deliberate, concrete, and targeted" steps, within a reasonable amount of time
after the U.S.-Jordan FTA enters into force, to ensure that their labor laws meet
and protect international standards, to improve those laws, and to ensure that
they do not weaken or offer to weaken those laws to attract trade. Second, the
parties must move as "expeditiously and effectively" as possible toward this goal.
Third, to remain in compliance with the accord, the parties must fully justify
any measures moving away from that goal, such as amending laws to ban unions
in free trade zones or waiving the minimum age of employment in the agro-
export sector to encourage investment.
Following this line of reasoning, while the U.S.-Jordan FTA's qualifying
"strive to" language makes enforcement of the requirements that follow more
complicated and subjective, the requirements are nonetheless very much en-
forceable. This interpretation is supported by the September 2001 remarks of
Senator Gramm during the Senate floor debate over the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Area Implementation Act, during which he repeatedly expressed his displeasure
with the accord's workers' rights provisions, warning:
Under this bill, we agree with Jordan that we will not take
any actions with regard to our labor.., laws that would advan-
tage us in our trading with Jordan .....
Now, granted the Clinton administration puts nice boiler-
plate language that says to Jordan, you make your own laws; and
it says to the United States, you make your own laws. But it also
says, if those laws are judged to improve your competitiveness as
a result of a reduction in your level of. . . protection, then there
can be reprisals.
[We could find ourselves in a situation where a change in
a labor ... law was judged by an international decisionmaking
body or dispute resolution mechanism to benefit us in trade ....
But by judging it in those terms, we could literally have tariffs im-
posed on any American product sold on the world market.5'
51. 147 CON. REC. S9679, S9686-92 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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2. TPA's Failure to Incorporate the Jordan Standard
TPA's overall and principal negotiating objectives on workers' rights con-
tain language very similar to the U.S.-Jordan FTA's workers' rights provisions,
which led certain members of Congress during the heated TPA debate to erro-
neously characterize TPA as meeting the Jordan standard.
For example, Representatives William J. Jefferson (D-LA) and John Tanner
(D-TN) stated that TPA "includes a substantive, enforceable standard on labor
... directly taken from the Jordan Free Trade Agreement. '5 2 Similarly, Senator
Max Baucus (D-MT) explained to the Democratic Leadership Council:
[F]ast track language incorporates all of the elements of the Jor-
dan Agreement .... [T]hose who criticize the fast track bill as not
meeting the Jordan standard are simply wrong.... [It makes Jor-
dan the model for new negotiations.... Jordan constitutes a prac-
tical floor for future agreements.53
Additionally, Senator Baucus told an audience at the Institute for Inter-
national Economics:
The Senate bill expressly directs U.S. negotiators to pursue labor
rights ... provisions in new agreements that... fully reflect the
standard set forth in the U.S.-Jordan FTA. 4
In the Senate debate over the conference report on the Trade Act of 2002, Sen-
ator Baucus reiterated that view with respect to TPA's workers' rights provisions:
[T]his bill adopts the standards set forth in the United States-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement; that is, as a floor. No standards in
future trade agreements can go below the floor set in the United
52. H.R. REP. No. 107-249, pt. 1, at 81 (2001) ("Additional Views" of Reps. Jefferson & Tanner).
At the same time, however, they also noted that TPA "does not take steps to impose [labor] stan-
dards on developing countries," and lamented that "[slome of our colleagues advocate for the im-
position of ILO standards on developing countries.., a position that has no chance of succeeding
domestically or internationally." Id.
53. Sen. Max Baucus, Statement to the Democrat Leadership Council (Feb. 12, 2001).
54. Sen. Max Baucus, Statement before the Institute for International Economics (Feb. 26,
2002).
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States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, which is a pretty high floor,
but certainly agreements can be higher.
The conference bill's fast-track provisions fully adopt the Jor-
dan provisions, and the bill makes it clear that Jordan is the model
for every free-trade agreement we negotiate; that is, the bottom
floor is Jordan.55
Nonetheless, TPA falls short of including the three components of the Jordan
standard on workers' rights articulated above, instead containing only the second.
Only if TPA articulated all four of the U.S.-Jordan FTA's key workers'
rights provisions among its principal negotiating objectives-all of which must
give rise to equally enforceable trade accord provisions-would the legislation
arguably incorporate the Jordan standard. TPA, however, includes only one of
the four as a principal negotiating objective: that countries not fail to effectively
enforce their labor laws in a manner affecting trade between them. The require-
ment that countries strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce domestic
labor laws to encourage trade is contained among TPA's overall negotiating ob-
jectives, which in contrast to principal negotiating objectives, may give rise to
unenforceable, hortatory trade accord provisions. The U.S.-Jordan FTA lan-
guage demanding that parties strive to ensure that their labor laws meet inter-
national standards, to improve them in that light, and not to offer to weaken or
reduce those laws to attract trade is omitted entirely from TPA.
Thus, as Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) noted, unlike the U.S.-Jordan
ETA, which "actually includes provisions safeguarding minimum labor standards
in the main text of the agreement," 56 TPA does not "require countries with whom
we trade.., to strive to meet the standards of the ILO. This means our trading
partners may fail to prohibit child labor or forced labor if no such domestic laws
exist." 57 Representatives Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), Michael R. McNulty (D-
NY), Robert T. Matsui (D-CA), Sander Levin (D-MI), William J. Coyne (D-PA),
and Xavier Becerra (D-CA) similarly observed that, in contrast to the U.S.-Jordan
ETA, TPA "would provide only that a country enforce its own laws whatever they
may be. There is only rhetoric and no requirement that a country's law include
55. 148 CONG. REC. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
56. 148 CONG. REC. S4824, S4825 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
57. Id.
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any of the five core labor standards-bans on child labor, discrimination, and
slave labor, and the rights to associate and to bargain collectively."'
As a result, a number of lawmakers have sought to highlight that despite oc-
casional statements to the contrary, TPA fails to incorporate the Jordan stan-
dard. Senator Dodd observed:
IT]he fast track bill that passed the House and the one that just
passed this body does not include Jordan standards.... An
amendment that I offered requiring new fast-track authority to
be in parity with the Jordan standards was voted down.... The
managers of this bill have mistakenly been saying that the bill fol-
lows the labor conditions contained in the Jordan agreement.
59
Agreeing with Senator Dodd, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) noted:
I am deeply concerned that some... Members of Congress are
pushing the Administration to adhere to a highly controversial and
vague "Jordan Standard" ... that is not clearly reflected in the
Trade Promotion Authority negotiating objectives. While the
labor.., and dispute settlement negotiating objectives in the Bipar-
tisan Trade Promotion Authority Act are loosely based on provi-
sions found in the Jordan Free Trade Agreement, there is clearly a
distinction between the two. In implementing the will of Congress
as embodied in the Trade Promotion Authority Act, it is critically
important for the administration to keep this distinction in mind.'
Senator Gramm also concurred, explaining:
In general, the Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) must not be
considered as a new template for future trade bills in general and
58. H.R. REP. No. 107-249, pt. 1, at 54 (2001) ("Dissenting Views" of Reps. Rangel, McNulty,
Matsui, Levin, Coyne, and Becerra). The "core labor standards" to which the representatives refer
are the fundamental workers' rights identified by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
supra note 34.
59. 148 CONG. REC. S4824, S4825-26 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
60. 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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this bill in particular.... While some elements of the Jordan FTA
are present in this bill, it certainly does not embody a "Jordan stan-
dard" of any kind.6'
3. Does TPA Allow Accords to Meet the Jordan Standard?
Although TPA does not require that free trade accords meet the Jordan
standard on workers' rights, a more complex question is whether TPA at least
permits them to do so. More specifically, the question is whether TPA allows the
negotiation of free trade accords in which all four of the U.S.-Jordan FTA's key
workers' rights provisions are binding and enforceable: the one included in TPA
as a principal negotiating objective, the one included as an overall negotiating
objective, and the ones excluded from TPA entirely.
The answer, as implied above, turns on the interpretation of language in
two key TPA provisions: principal negotiating objective (12) to seek provisions
that treat all "principal" negotiating objectives equally with respect to dispute
settlement mechanisms; and the qualifying language of principal negotiating
objective (1 1)(B), added by Senator Gramm and known as the "Gramm lan-
guage," 62 that "no retaliation may be authorized based on the exercise" of parties'
rights, set forth in the immediately preceding text, to "exercise discretion with
respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and
to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with re-
spect to other labor ... matters determined to have higher priorities" and their
right "to establish domestic labor standards."
63
Although principal negotiating objective (12) requires that all free trade ac-
cord provisions giving effect to principal negotiating objectives be "equally" en-
forceable with equally available equivalent dispute settlement procedures and
remedies,' it is silent with respect to overall negotiating objectives. It fails to re-
quire such enforcement parity for trade accord provisions fulfilling these objectives
but also fails to prohibit parity. Thus, principal negotiating objective (12) leaves
open the option of enforceable trade agreement provisions based on TPA's overall
negotiating objectives or on objectives not even articulated in the legislation.
61. S. R.nP. No. 107-139, at 64 (2002) ("Additional Views" of Sen. Gramm).
62. 148 CONG. REc. S4826 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(1 1)(B) (Supp. II 2002).
64. See 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(12)(G).
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The Gramm language, however, explicitly bans retaliation against countries
for exercising certain explicitly articulated rights, which can be divided into two
categories: the right to exercise discretion regarding labor law enforcement and
the right to establish domestic labor standards. To determine whether the
Gramm language prevents free trade accords negotiated under TPA from meet-
ing the Jordan standard, the scope of this ban as applied to these rights must be
defined.
Like the U.S.-Jordan FTA, TPA provides not only that countries retain the
right to exercise discretion with respect to labor law application decisions, includ-
ing resource allocation for enforcement, but that any "reasonable exercise of such
discretion," or a "bona fide decision" regarding resource allocation, shall not be
considered a free trade accord violation." Therefore, trade agreement parties
shall face no punitive consequences as a result of the "reasonable exercise" of this
right. Thus, when it explicitly asserts that "no retaliation may be authorized based
on the exercise" of this right, the Gramm language is merely redundant. As Sen-
ator Baucus similarly observed, the Gramm language serves only:
to clarify the language that precedes it in subparagraph (B). That
is, in negotiating provisions on trade and labor..., the United
States should make clear that a country is effectively enforcing its
laws if a course of action or inaction is the result of a reasonable
exercise of discretion or a bona fide decision regarding the alloca-
tion of resources, and, as such, the country cannot be subject to re-
taliation on the basis of that course of action or inaction alone.'
Furthermore, to interpret the Gramm language more broadly to ban all re-
taliation related to domestic labor law enforcement would render TPA inter-
nally contradictory. Specifically, the Gramm language would make it impossible
to negotiate a free trade accord provision, enforceable through equivalent dis-
pute settlement mechanisms and remedies, that fulfilled TPA's principal negoti-
ating objective to ensure that countries effectively apply their domestic labor
laws.6'7 Yet TPA instructs U.S. trade negotiators to do just that.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(1 1)(B); see U.S.-Jordan FTA,supra note 38, art. 6(4)(b), 41 I.L.M. at 70.
66. S. REP. No. 107-139, at 30 (2002).
67. Internal contradiction should be avoided when interpreting statutes. See 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN 500 (6th ed. 2000).
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Thus, the first part of the Gramm language barring retaliation merely re-
iterates provisions already set forth in TPA, as well as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, and
it presents no obstacle to the fulfillment of the Jordan standard on workers'
rights in free trade accords negotiating under TPA.
Nonetheless, the second part of the Gramm language-that "no retaliation
may be authorized based on the exercise of... the right to establish domestic
labor standards"-raises more difficult issues. Specifically, does this limitation
preclude the negotiation of enforceable free trade accord provisions that, like in
the U.S.-Jordan FTA, prohibit countries from weakening or derogating from
their domestic labor laws or offering to do so to attract trade, or that require that
countries' domestic laws meet international standards and that they improve
them in that light?
In this regard, Senator Dodd noted:
The few Jordan standards that are in the bill have been made
meaningless by the rejection of Senator Lieberman's amendment
which would have deleted four lines from the bill that were added
by Senator Gramm of Texas. The Gramm language states that a
party has the right to establish its own domestic labor standards
... regardless of how these domestic laws may deviate from ac-
cepted international norms in these areas.... Other countries can
weaken their labor.. . laws to gain a competitive advantage, and
we will have no recourse against such actions."
But does the Gramm language require the negotiation of free trade accords
that fit the model described by Senator Dodd? Because Senator Gramm failed to
elaborate on the Senate floor regarding the intent of the language he inserted
into TPA, there is no directly relevant legislative history to serve as interpretive
guidance. The senator's statements during the debate over the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Area Implementation Act in September 2001, however, suggest that he
would answer the question affirmatively.
In the context of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act,
Gramm articulated at length his opposition to the U.S.-Jordan FTA require-
ment that parties strive to ensure that their laws meet international standards, to
improve those standards, and to ensure that they do not waive or derogate from
68. 148 CONG. REC. S4826 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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domestic labor laws or offer to do so to encourage trade. He perceived these re-
quirements as a threat to U.S. sovereignty, noting:
What is wrong is, for the first time, Ithe U.S.-Jordan FTA] brings
into a trade agreement items that have to do with domestic law. It
brings into a free trade agreement provisions that relate to labor
law and labor standards ... in America. And in the process, we
are literally transferring a degree of American sovereignty in
labor.. . areas to decision-making entities that will be beyond the
control of the United States. This is a very serious matter.69
Senator Gramm also repeatedly clarified that his vote for the U.S.-Jordan
FTA "sets no precedent in terms of our willingness to cede sovereignty over
America's right to set its own ... labor laws.., without being penalized in world
trade because some international decisionmaking body decides, in doing so, we
benefited ourselves in terms of trade.
70
To determine whether TPA's Gramm language accomplishes the ends for
which the senator may have hoped, however, it must be assessed according to es-
tablished rules of statutory interpretation. These rules indicate that:
Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, reference to legislation
in other states and jurisdictions which pertains to the same subject
matter, persons, things, or relations, may be a helpful source of in-
terpretive guidance. One need only show through the similarity
of language that the act being construed was copied from another
state or states.7'
Thus, insofar as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, which became U.S. law through the sign-
ing of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act, contains language
similar to TPA, the agreement is relevant to the interpretation of TPA provi-
sions, including the Gramm language.
7 2
69. 147 CONG. REC. S9685 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
70. 147 CONG. REC. S9687 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
71. 2A SINGER, supra note 67, at 307-09.
72. As discussed above, TPA incorporates into its overall and principal negotiating objectives
many, though not all, of the workers' rights provisions of the U.S.-Jordan FTA. 19 U.S.C. § 3803
(Supp. II 2002).
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Like the Gramm language, the U.S.-Jordan FTA recognizes a country's
"right to establish domestic labor standards."7 Going even further, the U.S.-
Jordan FTA also explicitly recognizes a country's right "to adopt or modify ac-
cordingly its labor laws and regulations.
7 4
It is axiomatic that inherent in every right is the freedom to enjoy it without
suffering negative consequences. If it were otherwise, the right would be ren-
dered meaningless. Thus, when the U.S.-Jordan FTA recognizes a country's
right to set its own labor laws, it implicitly bars retaliation based on the exercise
of that right. When the Gramm language adds in TPA, explicitly, that "no retal-
iation may be authorized based on the exercise of... the right to establish do-
mestic labor standards," it is, therefore, once again simply redundant,
articulating the truism that retaliation cannot be based on the exercise of an es-
tablished right.
In addition to recognizing a country's right to establish, adopt, and modify
its labor laws, however, the U.S.-Jordan FTA also requires a country to strive to
ensure that those domestic labor laws uphold international standards, to im-
prove them, and not to weaken them or offer to do so to attract trade. This re-
quirement is enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as all
other accord provisions and its violation subject to equal remedies. On its face,
this requirement may appear at odds with a country's sovereign right to legislate,
also recognized in the U.S.-Jordan FTA.
Following basic rules of statutory interpretation that seek to avoid internal
contradictions, 7 however, the rights reaffirmed by the U.S.-Jordan FTA must be
compatible with the requirements established. How is this possible? The right to
legislate is a procedural right devoid of substantive content. Therefore, it is not in-
consistent for the U.S.-Jordan FTA to recognize a country's right to establish do-
mestic labor laws while placing substantive restrictions on the exercise of that
right, requiring that a country either strive to meet certain workers' rights goals
or face negative consequences. Such retaliation, however, is not based on the exer-
cise of the procedural right to legislate. Instead, it is based on violation of the sub-
stantive workers' rights framework within which that right must be exercised.
Similarly, free trade accords negotiated under TPA could also contain the
same enforceable substantive requirements for countries' domestic labor legisla-
73. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 38, art. 6(3), 41 I.L.M. at 70.
74. Id.
75. See 2A SINGER, Supra note 67, at 500.
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tion as the U.S.-Jordan FTA without running afoul of the Gramm language. If
Senator Gramm had wished to prevent free trade accords negotiated under
TPA from containing the third component of the Jordan standard on workers'
rights, the language he added should have barred any enforceable substantive
parameters on the exercise of the procedural right to legislate, explicitly banning
retaliation based on a country's failure to strive to ensure that it does not weaken
or reduce domestic labor laws or offer to do so as an encouragement for trade, to
ensure that its domestic labor laws meet international standards, and to improve
them in that light.
D. Free Trade Accords under TPA
No accord completed under TPA, however, meets the Jordan standard on
workers' rights. 76 Instead, although these recently negotiated agreements in-
clude a number of labor rights provisions, only one is enforceable and subject to
the accords' dispute settlement mechanisms and remedies if violated: the re-
quirement that countries effectively apply domestic labor laws in matters affect-
ing trade between them. 77 While the accords incorporate, almost verbatim, the
U.S.-Jordan FTA requirements that countries strive to ensure that their laws
meet international standards, that they improve them, and that they not waive
or derogate from them or offer to do so to attract trade, none of these provisions
is enforceable. Their violation cannot give rise to dispute settlement or punitive
consequences for the violators.
Thus, in negotiating free trade agreements since 2002, U.S. negotiators have
generally interpreted TPA's provisions on workers' rights as a ceiling, not a
76. See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Hein's No. KAV
6375; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, Hein's No. KAV
6376; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, Hein's No.
KAV 7206; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Aus., May 18, 2004, Hein's No.
KAV 6422; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Bahr., Sept.
14, 2004, Hein's No. KAV 6866; United States-The Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Cent. Am., Aug. 5,2004, Hein's No. KAV 7157.
77. The accords define the "labor laws" that countries must effectively apply as those statutes
and regulations directly related to the same five workers' rights identified by TPA as "core labor
standards." See supra note 34. As a result, those statutes and regulations governing employment
and occupation discrimination are not among the labor laws that countries must effectively en-
force under the agreements.
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floor.7" TPA requires only that the principal negotiating objectives on labor, not
the overall negotiating objectives or the specifically articulated priorities, give
rise to enforceable accord provisions, and this is the guideline that has been
largely followed.79
CONCLUSION
Senator Baucus told the Democratic Leadership Council, "[T]here will al-
ways be those that say the fast track bill doesn't do enough on labor .... To them
I say that this bill is an enormous step forward. It is far stronger on these issues
than any previous grant of fast track."8 TPA, however, is not a step forward. It
is a step backward from the Trade Act of 1974, which instructed U.S. trade ne-
gotiators to "take such action as may be necessary" to ensure that the global trad-
ing system, as governed by the GATT, included an enforceable requirement
backed up through public petition and confrontation procedures and that coun-
tries adhere to "international fair labor standards."' Though TPA does not cat-
egorically ban the negotiation of trade accords containing such an enforceable
requirement, it also does not instruct U.S. negotiators to pursue that goal. Since
TPA passage in 2002, all free trade accords negotiated between the United States
and its trading partners have fallen far short of this standard.
78. One notable exception, however, is that these accords include the requirements that coun-
tries strive to ensure that their laws meet international standards, that they improve them in that
light, and that they not offer to weaken their labor laws as an encouragement for trade, though
TPA omits any such language from its negotiating objectives.
79. U.S. trade negotiators have, however, failed even to follow this guideline with respect to
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